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Counterparty Responses to Managerial Overconfidence 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Existing research links CEO personality traits to a number of corporate decisions including 
overinvestment, external acquisitions, and earnings management. These findings raise the 
question of whether counterparties distinguish between differences in individual CEO behavior, 
and how they respond to it. We focus on two key counterparties – auditors and credit rating 
agencies – and examine whether audit fees and credit ratings are affected by CEO 
overconfidence. We find a positive association between audit fees and CEO overconfidence, 
suggesting that auditors exert more effort or increase the risk premium associated with auditing 
firms with more overconfident CEOs. We also find a significant negative association between 
CEO overconfidence and credit ratings, suggesting that overconfident CEOs are associated with 
higher agency costs of debt and higher credit risk. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent studies empirically examine the personality of CEOs, and how it affects decisions 
such as acquisitions, leverage, earnings management, management forecasting, and tax 
avoidance (e.g., Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Frank and Goyal 
2007; Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Hribar and Yang 
2011; Schrand and Zechman 2011). 1  In some cases, the researcher looks for common 
characteristics by identifying and following CEOs as they change firms over time, without 
specifying the underlying characteristics of the executive. In other cases, researchers attempt to 
identify ex-ante characteristics that are expected to affect decisions in a predicted direction. The 
common theme across these studies is the premise that individual psychology is a persistent 
determinant of important corporate decisions. However, a less explored consequence of these 
studies is the extent to which parties that transact with the firm recognize the CEO’s personality 
and modify their contracts with the firm (explicit or implicit) to account for the anticipated effect 
of the CEO’s personality on key firm decisions.  
Because an individual’s personality is a multi-dimensional construct, we focus on one 
dimension of CEO personality that has been studied extensively in recent finance and accounting 
literature: overconfidence. We examine how key counterparties to the firm respond when 
contracting with CEOs that exhibit varying degrees of overconfidence. In our first setting, we 
examine whether firms’ auditors charge different fees depending on the CEO’s level of 
overconfidence. There are several reasons why CEO overconfidence could affect audit fees. First, 
                                                            
1 The first strand of research documents the existence of “manager styles” (i.e., manager fixed effects) across several 
corporate decisions (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Frank and Goyal 2007; Bamber et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; 
Yang 2012). The second stream of research examines the effect of a specific individual trait (e.g., overconfidence) 
on firms’ investment, financing, forecasting, and earnings management decisions (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; 
Hribar and Yang 2011; Schrand and Zechman 2011). 
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a more overconfident CEO should increase litigation risk because of the direct link between CEO 
overconfidence and financial reporting decisions. For example, Schrand and Zechman (2011) 
find overconfident CEOs are more likely to commit accounting fraud based on SEC Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Additionally, Hribar and Yang (2011) find that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to voluntarily issue optimistic earnings forecasts which they 
subsequently miss. 
Second, more overconfident CEOs should increase litigation risk because of their 
investment decisions and how their investments affect financial reporting. Prior studies 
document that overconfident CEOs tend to engage in non-value maximizing activities such as 
excess investment and unsuccessful acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). When 
managers engage in value-destroying activities, they are more likely to also engage in earnings 
management to mask bad outcomes from their decisions (Christie and Zimmerman 1994).   
Third, the extent of CEO overconfidence affects audit fees directly through the required 
level of audit effort. Audit texts and the COSO framework suggest that tone at the top is an 
important consideration when assessing the control risk of a firm.2 Additionally, theory on CEO 
overconfidence demonstrates that overconfident CEOs underinvest in information acquisition 
and provide information of poorer quality to shareholders and the board (Goel and Thakor 2008). 
This suggests that auditors will need to increase substantive testing to maintain a desired level of 
overall audit risk for firms with poorer internal information environments due to CEO 
overconfidence.  
                                                            
2 COSO considers “tone at the top” an important factor when describing management’s responsibility for 
maintaining a positive control environment in their Internal Control – Integrated Framework report (COSO 1992). 
Similarly, AU Section 319 requires auditors to obtain sufficient understanding of a firm’s internal control 
environment by inquiring and observing management in planning the audit.  
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In our second setting, we examine whether credit analysts are able to identify different 
CEO personalities and use that information in analyzing the firm’s credit risk. Agency theory 
suggests that one of the key components of the agency cost of debt is the ‘asset substitution’ or 
‘risk incentive’ problem identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The main argument is that 
managers will substitute riskier projects because their equity position can be viewed as a call 
option on the firm, and call options have values that increase in the risk of the underlying asset.  
As such, the agency cost of debt is increasing in the amount of leverage. Combining this with 
recent research on overconfidence suggests that agency costs of debt will be higher if CEOs are 
more overconfident. For example, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find more overconfident CEOs 
exhibit a tendency to overinvest, and rely more heavily on debt financing. Frank and Goyal 
(2007) show that managerial fixed effects are important for explaining the amount of leverage, 
but that the effect is well explained by measurable traits such as age, gender, tenure, or 
educational background. These studies provide a direct link between CEO overconfidence and 
their investing and financing choices, both of which increase the agency costs of debt. 
Also, similar to auditors, credit rating agencies cite tone at the top as an important 
consideration in their rating decisions. For example, in their 2008 Corporate Ratings Criteria, 
Standard & Poor’s notes that evaluation of top management is “an input for both business risk 
and financial risk profiles – reflecting the fact that management’s strategy, decisions, and 
policies affect all aspects of a company’s activity” (S&P 2008, p. 32). We therefore predict that, 
as with audit fees, the ratings issued by credit rating agencies will be affected by the degree of 
overconfidence exhibited by the CEO.3 
                                                            
3 Our analysis complements the work of Sunder, Sunder, and Tan (2010), who find that bond investors restrict 
merger and investment activities of overconfident CEOs through the use of direct restrictions on investment and 
through financing restrictions. 
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Auditors and credit rating analysts share some characteristics that make them good 
research settings to examine how counterparties respond to CEO behavior. First, both parties 
have access to management and are therefore able to perform their own assessment of the CEO’s 
personality. Second, the nature of the relationship between the firm and both auditors and credit 
rating agencies is such that overconfidence has a predictable effect on the role being served by 
the counterparties.  For reasons discussed above, auditing the financial statements and issuing a 
credit rating are both expected to be directly affected by the types of business decisions that 
existing research shows overconfident managers are prone to making (e.g., overinvestment, poor 
acquisitions, overly optimistic forecasts, and earnings management).  
We measure the level of CEO overconfidence in two ways.  First, following past research, 
we determine the relative extent of overconfidence based on popular press characterizations of 
the CEO (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2008; Jin and Kothari 2008; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 
2011; Hribar and Yang 2011).  Specifically, we use a sample of 974 CEOs listed on the Fortune 
500 from 2000 to 2007, and determine whether the CEO is more overconfident or more 
conservative based on the descriptions of the CEO in published articles. Because we are 
interested in CEOs that fall on both ends of the overconfidence spectrum, we define search terms 
to capture characteristics that are expected to be both positively and negatively associated with 
overconfidence, and use the frequency of these descriptions to place the CEO somewhere along 
the overconfidence continuum. Following Hribar and Yang (2011), we measure this trait at the 
CEO level (not CEO-year) since it is a personality trait that should be relatively stable across 
time. This approach also reduces the possibility of unidentified omitted variables that influence 
both the press characterizations and the counterparty’s response, and minimizes the likelihood 
that other (unidentified) time-varying economic events explain our results. Our second measure 
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uses the press-based characterization as one variable measuring overconfidence, and adds 
information about CEO option-exercising behavior and the extent of management forecast bias.  
We use factor analysis to extract the common variance from these three variables and use this as 
a second proxy for overconfidence. 
Following Simunic (1980), we define audit fees as a function of (1) audit effort and (2) 
the present value of expected losses to the auditor from being involved with the company’s audit. 
The second component typically arises from litigation. We expect auditors to consider firms with 
more overconfident CEOs to require more audit effort and to have a higher litigation risk. As 
such, we expect to observe a positive association between the extent of CEO overconfidence and 
audit fees. We identify a set of determinants based on prior literature that we expect to be 
associated with audit fees (e.g., Simunic 1980; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Hanlon, Krishnan, 
and Mills 2012; Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008). The determinants are intended to 
measure the resources required to complete the audit, with various proxies for size and 
complexity. Controlling for these determinants, we observe a significant positive association 
between CEO overconfidence and audit fees. We also examine whether changes in the 
personality of the CEO, stemming from a change in the CEO, are associated with changes in 
audit fees. We find that when a firm hires a new CEO who is characterized as more 
overconfident, auditors respond by increasing fees.  
To examine the association between CEO overconfidence and credit ratings we convert 
Standard & Poor’s senior debt ratings from letters into numbers, with larger numbers indicating a 
higher rating. We then estimate an ordered logistic regression controlling for firm characteristics 
such as size, profitability, and risk that prior research has shown are associated with the cost of 
debt (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris 2002). Our 
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results indicate a significant negative association between credit ratings and the extent of CEO 
overconfidence. This result is consistent with credit analysts preferring less overconfident 
managers and reducing their rating for firms with highly overconfident CEOs. We also estimate 
a changes specification where we examine changes in credit ratings in response to changes in 
CEO overconfidence, again based on CEO turnover. Consistent with expectations, we find that 
replacing the existing CEO with a more overconfident CEO is negatively associated with 
changes in credit ratings.  
One challenge with our research is that we are interested in modeling the effect of 
overconfidence on audit fees and credit ratings after controlling for the behavior that is predicted 
by overconfidence. Stated differently, we are interested in showing that CEO overconfidence 
affects contracting even after controlling for the outcomes predicted by overconfidence, such as 
acquisitions and earnings management. We predict that after controlling for the business 
decisions made by overconfident CEOs, the counterparties will still incorporate the level of 
overconfidence in their fees and credit ratings because of the anticipated future actions of the 
CEO or the unobservability of potential actions taken by the CEO.  In essence, we are trying to 
determine whether CEO overconfidence provides incremental information about audit fees and 
credit ratings beyond observable and measurable business decisions. We expect CEO 
overconfidence provides auditors and credit analysts with an additional useful signal about both 
litigation risk and credit worthiness beyond the information conveyed by other firm 
characteristics. That is, when these contracting parties observe a more overconfident CEO, they 
anticipate it is more likely that CEO has or will make investment and financial reporting 
decisions that will result in outcomes such as default, restatements, or SEC investigations.  
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Our paper contributes to three areas of research. First, we extend the literature that 
examines the association between managerial characteristics and corporate decisions. Our 
analysis suggests counterparties can observe the personality traits of executives and contract with 
the firm accordingly. We conclude that, in addition to the direct costs stemming from the 
suboptimal business decisions of overconfident CEOs, there are significant indirect costs 
imposed by counterparties that bear risk associated with these decisions. Second, we extend 
research examining the determinants of audit fees by showing that auditors increase fees when 
managers exhibit characteristics that increase the auditors’ litigation risk. Third, we increase the 
understanding of the factors credit rating agencies use in evaluating firms’ creditworthiness. 
Consistent with the claims made by the agencies, our results suggest that credit ratings are 
adjusted based on an assessment of management characteristics.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
prior literature. Section 3 describes the sample selection and variable definitions. We discuss the 
research design and empirical results for tests of the association between CEO overconfidence, 
audit fees, and credit ratings in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
II. Hypothesis Development   
2.1 Audit Fees and CEO Overconfidence 
O’Keefe, Simunic, and Stein (1994) find auditors charge higher fees for riskier clients. 
Using confidential survey data, Bell, Landsman, and Shackelford (2001) find that when auditors 
deem inherent risk to be high they respond by increasing the number of audit hours. Krishnan, 
Pevzner, and Sengupta (2011) point out that both the risk of earnings management and litigation 
risk increase auditors’ expected losses because they increase the probability of litigation against 
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the auditor. Reynolds and Francis (2000) note that auditors could also lose reputational capital 
when their clients are sued. Building on the premise that auditors increase fees when they deem 
accounting quality to be low, Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson (2011) find the unexplained component 
of audit fees is positively associated with future restatements and cases of fraud. Together, these 
studies suggest audit fees contain information about auditors’ private assessment of the fraud and 
litigation risk posed by their clients.    
Our objective is to determine whether auditors consider aspects of the CEO’s personality 
when making their assessment of the business risk posed by their client.4 Existing research about 
the effect of CEO overconfidence on business decisions suggests that CEO overconfidence could 
serve as a red-flag to auditors of increased litigation risk. Malmendier and Tate (2005) predict 
that overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view 
external financing as overly costly. Consistent with their predictions, they find that investments 
of CEOs identified as being overconfident are significantly more sensitive to cash flow than that 
of other CEOs. Hribar and Yang (2011) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to miss 
their own forecasts of earnings. Making overly optimistic earnings forecasts and suboptimal 
investments is likely to put overconfident CEOs in a position where they have a strong incentive 
to manage earnings in order to mask their poor performance.  
 Consistent with overconfident CEOs being under excessive pressure to manage earnings, 
Schrand and Zechman (2011) find overconfident CEOs are more likely to commit accounting 
fraud. They argue that overconfident managers are likely to view earnings shortfalls as 
temporary and are therefore more inclined to engage in earnings management that they believe 
will be obscured by strong future performance. Schrand and Zechman (2011) speculate that 
                                                            
4 We define an auditor’s business risk as the risk the auditor will suffer losses because of their association with a 
particular client stemming from either litigation or impairment to the auditor’s reputation.  
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when performance does not improve, the overconfident CEO is forced to engage in more 
egregious forms of earnings management, eventually culminating in fraud. As such, the degree to 
which the CEO is either more or less overconfident represents a useful signal to auditors of 
increased fraud risk and litigation risk.  
The above research is somewhat one-sided in that it primarily portrays the costs of CEO 
overconfidence, and seems to raise the question as to why firms would hire or retain 
overconfident CEOs in equilibrium. However, overconfidence is a characteristic that also has 
advantages. For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2011) find that overconfident CEOs are more 
innovative in that they generate more patents. From a shareholder’s perspective, it may not be a 
suboptimal decision to have an overconfident CEO run the firm. In addition, it could well be that 
overconfidence is associated with likelihood of promotion in the labor market, given that one 
effect of overconfidence is a higher variance of outcomes due to the riskier project selection 
(Goel and Thakor 2008).   
Our paper provides an additional cost associated with overconfidence. In addition to the 
effects of CEO personality on auditors’ risk assessments, we also expect auditors to take into 
account the greater amount of effort required to audit firms with overconfident CEOs. Goel and 
Thakor (2008) analyze the behavior of managers and show that CEOs who are overconfident 
about their private information underinvest in information acquisition, leading them to provide 
information of lower quality to investors and the board.5 If overconfidence leads to suboptimally 
low information production and a poorer internal information environment, then we expect 
auditors to also take this into account when assessing their required level of audit effort. Overall, 
this leads to our first hypothesis: 
                                                            
5 The implicit assumption here is that information production is not the CEO’s primary task, which is consistent with 
CEOs being mainly responsible for strategic, operational, and financial decisions. 
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H1: Audit fees are positively associated with CEO overconfidence. 
Of course, in order for the CEO’s personality to be a useful signal, the auditor must be 
able to recognize more overconfident CEOs from less overconfident ones, and understand the 
implications of this for the business risk posed by a client. Consistent with auditors being able to 
identify and understand the implications of CEO overconfidence, Krishnan et al. (2011) find 
auditors charge higher fees for firms issuing frequent and optimistic management forecasts. 
Similarly, Hogan and Wilkins (2008) find audit fees are higher in the year prior to disclosure of 
internal control deficiencies for a sample of firms with disclosed deficiencies. However, it is not 
clear from both of these studies whether the auditors are adjusting their fees as a response to the 
observed optimism in management forecasts, the likelihood of earnings management, or the 
personalities of the CEOs that give rise to these outcomes. In order to determine whether the 
actual traits of the CEO provide auditors with incremental useful information, our research 
design attempts to measure individual traits directly and then control for the outcomes of 
business decisions that prior research has shown to be associated with overconfidence (e.g., 
acquisitions and abnormal accruals).  
 
2.2 Credit Ratings and CEO Overconfidence 
The second setting where we examine how counterparties respond to CEO personality is 
credit ratings. Similar to auditors, debtholders bear agency costs associated with excessively 
risky or optimistic decisions of overconfident managers. Although shareholders can benefit from 
risky project choices that increase the variance of the firm’s future cash flows, these investments 
likely increase default risk to the detriment of the debtholders. Similar to auditors, credit analysts 
have private access to management and are expected to assess the personal traits of top 
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executives, and use this information. For these reasons, we believe this is another powerful 
setting to examine how counterparties respond to CEO personality.  
Credit ratings have important implications for bond yields and bank capital requirements. 
These ratings are likely to be of particular importance to firms with overconfident CEOs because 
existing research shows overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity financing in favor of either 
debt or internal funds (Malmendier and Tate 2005). Sunder et al. (2010) build on this work by 
examining how debt investors contract with firms with overconfident CEOs. Sunder et al. (2010) 
predict bondholders will require more covenant protection for firms with overconfident CEOs 
because these CEOs have a tendency to overinvest. They find evidence consistent with 
bondholders placing additional restrictions on the investments of firms with overconfident CEOs. 
To the extent bondholders place additional restrictions on firms with overconfident CEOs and 
those restrictions reduce the likelihood of future default, we may not expect to observe an 
association between credit ratings and CEO overconfidence. However, the fact that Malmendier 
and Tate (2005, 2008) document that overconfident CEOs tend to overinvest and make more 
value-destroying acquisitions suggests these additional investment restrictions are not sufficient 
in all cases to prevent CEOs from making suboptimal decisions.  
In addition to the research linking overconfidence to investment decisions, there is a 
second reason to expect a negative association between overconfidence and credit ratings. Hribar 
and Yang (2011) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts with 
greater error and optimistic bias. Schrand and Zechman (2011) find a positive association 
between CEO overconfidence and incidence of fraud. Together, these results suggest firms with 
overconfident CEOs produce lower quality accounting information. Financial reports provide 
credit analysts with a starting point to forecast future cash flow amounts, volatility, and sources. 
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Credit markets also react significantly to information in management forecasts (Shivakumar, 
Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang 2011). Consequently, low-quality accounting information is likely to 
be associated with lower credit ratings because the analysts’ primary sources of information for 
forecasting cash flows are less reliable. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: Credit ratings are negatively associated with CEO overconfidence. 
Similar to our analysis of audit fees, we control for the outcomes of the decisional biases 
of overconfident CEOs when establishing the link between CEO personality and credit ratings. 
Specifically, we include a measure of accrual quality in our credit rating model as an additional 
control variable because Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) find that higher accrual 
quality is positively associated with credit ratings. Our objective then is to determine whether 
credit analysts’ assessment of the CEO’s personality is incrementally informative about variation 
in credit ratings.  
 
III. Sample Selection and Variable Definitions 
We start with a sample of 640 firms and 974 CEOs listed in the Fortune 500 during the 
period of 2000 through 2007. We eliminate firms in the financial services industry (SIC codes 60-
69) and observations that are missing audit fee data in Audit Analytics. We require observations to 
have sufficient data in Compustat to compute a set of control variables in the audit fee model. Our 
selection criterion results in a sample of 490 firms, 758 CEOs, and 2,833 firm-years, which we 
refer to as the audit fee sample. To test the association between credit ratings and CEO 
personality, we further require observations to have Standard & Poor’s senior debt ratings and 
sufficient data in Compustat to compute a set of control variables in the credit rating model. This 
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procedure results in a sample of 369 firms, 568 CEOs, and 2,158 firm-years, which we refer to as 
the credit rating sample. 
Our measure of overconfidence uses popular press characterizations of the CEO.  Unlike 
measures based on equity holdings or option-exercising behavior, press characterizations are not a 
choice of the CEO, and are less susceptible to concerns about endogeneity or omitted variables.6 
We search for articles that mention CEOs in the New York Times, Business Week, Financial 
Times, the Economist, Forbes, Fortune, Time, and the Wall Street Journal. We look for words that 
describe the CEO and are either positively or negatively associated with overconfidence.  
Specifically, we count the number of articles describing the CEO as confident or optimistic which 
are expected to be positively associated with overconfidence, and conservative or not confident as 
terms that are expected to be negatively associated with overconfidence. Specifically, we use the 
search terms “confident” or “confidence” [Confident]; “optimistic” or “optimism” [Optimistic]; 
“conservative”, “reliable”, “steady”, “practical”, frugal”, or “cautious”  [Conservative]; and “not 
confident” or “not optimistic” [Not Confident]. 7  We also count the number of articles that 
describe the CEO during the whole sample period (TOTAL) to control for total press coverage of 
a CEO. Using these statistics, we construct a measure of CEO personality that is increasing in 
CEO confidence and decreasing in CEO conservatism as follows:  
CONF_CON = [(Confident+ Optimistic)-(Conservative + Not Confident)] / TOTAL.  
CONF_CON is a continuous variable that measures the relative frequency with which a 
CEO is described as confident or optimistic versus as conservative or not confident. Note that 
                                                            
6 Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2011) also show that there is a high correlation between 
their options-based and press-based measures, with the press-based measure being more stringent in identifying 
overconfident CEOs. 
7 While it is possible for CEOs to use more confident/optimistic language around specific firm events, Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) and Hribar and Yang (2011) do not find systematic differences between article types (i.e., confident 
or optimistic mentions) and sources (i.e., journalist, CEO, other), which mitigates the concern that the press 
mentions are driven by contemporaneous economic events.   
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CONF_CON is fixed for each CEO since Confident, Optimistic, Conservative, Not Confident, and 
TOTAL are article counts for the entire sample period.8 In addition to the continuous measure of 
CEO personality (CONF_CON), we also construct a discrete variable that takes the value of one 
(minus one) [zero] if the number of articles characterizing the CEO as confident or optimistic is 
greater than (less than) [equal to] the number of articles describing the CEO as conservative or not 
confident. We refer to this variable as CONF_DIS. Similar to CONF_CON, CONF_DIS is 
increasing in confidence.9  
As a second measure, we construct a measure of CEO overconfidence as the first factor 
(FACTOR) obtained from conducting a factor analysis on the continuous press-based measure of 
overconfidence (CONF_CON), an options-based measure of overconfidence (DELAYOPTIONS), 
and the management earnings forecast bias (BIAS). Following Schrand and Zechman (2011), we 
use the value of the CEO’s unexercised but exercisable options on Execucomp to construct 
DELAYOPTIONS. We obtain this by computing the log of the mean value of each CEO’s 
unexercised but exercisable options. We then assign this value to years in which data on 
unexercised but exercisable options are available for each CEO and years in which information 
about the CEO’s unexercised but exercisable options are not available. We do so because we 
believe that the individual trait that we are interested in should be relatively stable across time. 
We also proxy for CEO overconfidence using the optimistic bias in management forecasts 
because Hribar and Yang (2011) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to provide 
optimistic forecasts. To construct BIAS, we compute the mean of the difference between each 
                                                            
8 Refer to Hribar and Yang (2011) for more detailed information about the construction of the measures of CEO 
overconfidence. 
9 For consistency with prior research, the set of CEOs that are more often described as confident or optimistic are 
referred to as “overconfident”, despite the fact that this measure does not allow us to calibrate the appropriate level 
of confidence. However, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that this measure is highly correlated with their 
proprietary measure of overconfidence using CEOs’ equity portfolio holdings.  
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CEO’s earnings forecasts and actual earnings, scaled by beginning-of-year price.10 Similar to the 
construction of DELAYOPTIONS, we then assign this value to years in which CEOs issue 
management earnings forecasts and years in which CEOs do not. CEOs that are not on the 
Execucomp database or have never provided forecasts are dropped from this analysis, which 
results in a much smaller sample size. 
 
IV. Audit Fees and CEO Overconfidence 
4.1 Research design 
We test the association between audit fees and CEO personality by estimating the 
following regressions for the audit fee sample: 
ܮܰܣܷܦܨܧܧܵ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷܤܫܩ4 ൅ ߚସܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅
ߚହܤܷܵ ܵܧܩ ൅ ߚ଺ܨܩܰ ൅ ߚ଻ܫܸܰ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܧܥ ൅ ߚଽܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵଵܮܱܵܵ ൅
ߚଵଶܣܷܦ ܱܲܫܰ ൅ ߚଵଷܥܮܫܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଵସܮܫܴܶܫܵܭ ൅ ߚଵହܮܰܣܤܵܶܣܥܥ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܮܰܣܤܵܤܶܦ ൅
ߚଵ଻ܫܥܦ ൅ ߚଵ଼ܯ&ܣ ൅ ߝ  ሺ1ሻ  
LNAUDFEES is the log of audit fees and CONFIDENT represents our measures of CEO 
overconfidence (CONF_CON, CONF_DIS, and FACTOR). The definitions of the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. To control for potential serial and cross-sectional correlations among 
residuals, we cluster standard errors by CEO and include year indicator variables. We also include 
industry indicator variables to control for industry fixed effects. 
We identify a set of control variables based on prior research on determinants of audit fees 
(Simunic 1980; Gul, Chen, and Tsui 2003; Hanlon et al. 2012). We include the log of total assets 
(LNASSETS), the number of business segments (BUS SEG), the ratio of foreign sales to total 
                                                            
10 We restrict the sample to point management earnings forecasts and retain the last forecast for forecasts with 
multiple revisions.  
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assets (FGN), the ratio of inventory to total assets (INV), the ratio of receivables to total assets 
(REC), and the ratio of debt to total assets (DEBT) to control for the complexity of the audit and 
the resources required for the audit. We also include operating income deflated by total assets 
(INCOME) and an indicator variable that takes the value of one when income is negative and zero 
otherwise (LOSS) to proxy for inherent risk. Audit Opinion (AUD OPIN) is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if a firm receives a modified audit opinion and 0 otherwise, where a modified audit 
opinion is defined as anything other than a standard unqualified audit opinion coded as 1 by 
Compustat. CLIENT is a proxy for the importance of the client to the audit firm measured as the 
number of years that a firm has been a client for its auditor. We include an industry-based 
indicator variable (LITRISK) to proxy for litigation risk (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994). 
The log of the absolute value of total accruals (LNABSTACC) and the log of the absolute value of 
book-to-tax differences (LNABSBTD) are included to proxy for a firm’s accounting quality. ICD 
is an indicator variable set equal to one for firms receiving a qualified opinion on their internal 
controls, and zero for all other observations. M&A is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
if a firm engages in mergers and acquisitions, where sum of the deal values is greater than 5% of 
total assets, and zero for all other observations. We expect audit effort and fees to increase in the 
presence of M&A. Finally, we include the total number of articles for the entire sample period 
(TOTAL).11 
Next, we investigate whether changes in CEO overconfidence that stem from a change in 
the CEO are associated with changes in audit fees. Because we define overconfidence as a stable 
individual characteristic, changes in overconfidence can only occur with CEO turnover. To the 
extent that firm characteristics are relatively stable in two adjacent years, a changes model helps 
                                                            
11 All of the control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except for TOTAL, BIG4, BUS SEG, 
LOSS, AUD OPIN, CLIENT, LITRISK, ICD, and M&A. 
17 
 
mitigate potential concerns that our findings are attributed to unobserved heterogeneity in firm 
characteristics. All variables are defined as in the previous specification. Specifically, we estimate 
the following equation: 
 ∆ܮܰܣܷܦܨܧܧܵ ൌ
 ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ∆ܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷ∆ܤܫܩ4 ൅ ߚସ∆ܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚହ∆ܤܷܵ ܵܧܩ ൅
ߚ଺∆ܨܩܰ ൅ ߚ଻∆ܫܸܰ ൅ ߚ଼∆ܴܧܥ ൅ ߚଽ∆ܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚଵ଴∆ܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵଵ∆ܮܱܵܵ ൅
ߚଵଶ∆ܣܷܦ ܱܲܫܰ ൅ ߚଵଷ∆ܥܮܫܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଵସܮܫܴܶܫܵܭ ൅ ߚଵହ∆ܮܰܣܤܵܶܣܥܥ ൅ ߚଵ଺∆ܮܰܣܤܵܤܶܦ ൅
ߚଵ଻∆ܫܥܦ ൅ ߚଵ଼∆ܯ&ܣ ൅ ߝ  ሺ2ሻ 
To control for potential inter-temporal and cross-sectional dependence among residuals, 
we cluster standard errors by CEO and include year indicator variables.  
 
4.2 Empirical results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. The average 
CONF_CON is 0.017 with a median of zero, while the percentage of CEOs classified as 
overconfident is 26% using the discrete measure.12 An average CEO receives approximately 67 
press mentions during our sample period and 99% of the firms in our sample are audited by a Big 
4 audit firm. Panel A of Table 2 displays the correlations for the audit fee sample. As expected, all 
three proxies of CEO overconfidence (CONF_CON, CONF_DIS, and FACTOR) are positively 
and significantly correlated with LNAUDFEES. Consistent with prior literature, LNAUDFEES is 
positively correlated with the variables that proxy for firm complexity, such as LNASSETS, BUS 
SEG, FGN, and REC. LNAUDFEES is also positively correlated with LNABSTACC and 
                                                            
12 Hirshleifer et al. (2011) find that 8% of the CEOs in their sample are classified as overconfident using a CEO-year 
press-based measure for an earlier sample period (1993-2003). However, this value would be much higher if a CEO 
who is identified as overconfident in any year remains so throughout the sample period.  
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LNABSBTD, two variables that proxy for accounting quality. Overall, the correlation analyses 
provide preliminary evidence that audit fees are positively associated with CEO overconfidence. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] 
Table 3 provides the estimation results of equation (1). As predicted, Model 1 reveals that 
the coefficient estimate on CONF_CON is positive and statistically significant (β1=1.082, p-
value=0.001). Model 2 finds that our discrete measure of CEO personality also exhibits a 
statistically significant positive coefficient (β1=0.120, p-value=0.001). The coefficient on 
FACTOR is also positive and significant (β1=0.057, p-value=0.022). Overall, these results are 
consistent with auditors charging lower audit fees for clients with CEOs that are less 
overconfident. To assess the economic significance of the association between audit fees and 
CEO personality, we examine increases in audit fees when we move from the first quartile to the 
third quartile of CONF_CON. We find that moving from the first quartile to the third quartile of 
the distribution of CONF_CON increases audit fees by $1.04 million.13 The increase comprises 29% 
of the mean audit fees ($1.04 million/$3.58 million), which suggests that CEO overconfidence 
has an economically significant impact on audit fees.14 
[Insert Table 3] 
The estimation results of equation (2) are presented in Table 4. The findings are 
qualitatively consistent with those in Table 3. The coefficient estimates on ΔCONF_CON and 
ΔCONF_DIS are positive (β1=0.152 for ∆CONF_CON and β1=0.056 for ΔCONF_DIS) and the 
                                                            
13 The increase in fees is calculated as EXP (0.033 × 1.082) = $1.04 million. 
14 In supplemental analysis (untabulated) we partition our overconfidence measure into two separate measures. The 
first measure (OVER_CON) is equal to CONF_CON when CONF_CON is > 0 and OVER_CON = 0 otherwise. The 
second measure (CONSERVATIVE_CON) is equal to -1 * CONF_CON when CONF_CON is < 0 and 
CONSERVATIVE_CON = 0 otherwise. Interestingly, when we re-estimate equation (1) and examine these two 
components separately both are associated with audit fees in the predicted direction (β1=1.349, p value =0.000 for 
OVER_CON and β1=-0.814, p value = 0.111 for CONSERVATIVE_CON). This result suggests the observed 
association between our measure of overconfidence and audit fees is because firms with less overconfident CEOs 
are charged lower audit fees and firms with more overconfident CEOs are charged higher audit fees.  
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coefficient estimate on ΔCONF_DIS is significant (p-value=0.01). This is consistent with auditors 
increasing audit fees when a client hires a new CEO that exhibits greater overconfidence. 
Changing from a less overconfident CEO to a more overconfident CEO also appears to have 
economically significant impact on audit fees. Moving from a less overconfident CEO to a more 
overconfident CEO for a given firm increases audit fees by 6%.15 However, inconsistent with 
expectations, the coefficient estimate on FACTOR is negative and insignificant. Taken as a whole, 
the findings of Table 3 and Table 4 support our hypothesis that audit fees are positively associated 
with the level of CEO overconfidence. 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
V. Credit Ratings and CEO Overconfidence 
5.1 Research design 
  To examine whether CEO overconfidence is associated with credit ratings, we estimate 
an ordered logistic regression for the credit rating sample as follows:   
  Prሺܴܣܶܫܰܩܵሻ ൌ ߚ0 ൅ ߚଵܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚସܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅
ߚହܮܱܵܵ ൅ ߚ଺ܮܰܫܰܶ_ܥܱܸ ൅ ߚ଻ܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚ଼ܥܣܲ_ܫܰܶܧܰ ൅ ߚଽܥܪܣܧܳ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܴܦ ൅
ߚଵଵܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଶܵܦܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଷܵܦܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵସܯܤ ൅ ߚଵହܣܳ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܴܶܣܰܵܲ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩܫܰܦܧܺ ൅
ߝ  ሺ3ሻ 
Standard & Poor’s assigns senior debt ratings ranging from AAA to D to debt issuers. We 
convert Standard & Poor’s senior debt ratings from these letters into numbers ranging from 20 to 
1 with larger numbers indicating a higher rating (RATINGS). Again, CONFIDENT alternates 
between our measures of CEO overconfidence (CONF_CON, CONF_DIS, and FACTOR), and is 
                                                            
15 The increase in fees is calculated as EXP (0.056) = 1.06. 
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increasing in CEO overconfidence. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. To control 
for potential inter-temporal and cross-sectional dependence among residuals, we cluster standard 
errors by CEO and include year indicator variables.  
We select a battery of determinants that prior work shows are associated with credit 
ratings (e.g., Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ahmed et al. 2002; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Cheng 
and Subramanyam 2008). To proxy for a firm’s financial risk, we include variables that capture 
firm characteristics: the ratio of debt to total assets (DEBT), the ratio of operating income to total 
assets (INCOME), an indicator variable that equals one when a firm reports negative income and 
zero otherwise (LOSS), the log of the interest coverage ratio (LNINT_COV), the log of total assets 
(LNASSETS), the capital intensity (CAP_INTEN), an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
when shareholder equity increases and zero otherwise (CHAEQ), the ratio of R&D to total assets 
(RD), buy-and-hold raw stock returns over the past three years (RET), the standard deviation of 
RET (SDRET), the standard deviation of INCOME (SDINCOME), and the ratio of market value of 
equity to book value of equity (MB). We include Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality 
measure (AQ) and a measure of transparency from Gu (2002) (TRANSP) to control for 
information risk. We also include a firm’s corporate governance quality (GINDEX) as in 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Finally, we include the total number of articles for the entire 
sample period (TOTAL).16 
Next, we examine whether changes in credit ratings are associated with changes in the 
CEO’s personality due to CEO turnover. Because our dependent variable, RATINGS, has high 
autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors by CEO to account for potential inter-temporal 
dependence among residuals when estimating equation (3). Additionally, estimating a changes 
                                                            
16 All of the control variables are winsorized at the 1st  and 99th  percentiles except for TOTAL, LOSS, CHAEQ, 
TRANSP, and GINDEX. 
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specification of equation (3) provides an alternative way of accounting for such a problem. All 
variables are defined as in the previous section. Specifically, we estimate a changes model as 
follows: 
Prሺ∆ܴܣܶܫܰܩܵሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ∆ܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷ∆ܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚସ∆ܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚହܮܱܵܵ
൅ ߚ଺∆ܮܰܫܰ ஼ܶை௏ ൅ ߚ଻∆ܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚ଼∆ܥܣ ூܲே்ாே ൅ ߚଽܥܪܣܧܳ ൅ ߚଵ଴∆ܴܦ
൅ ߚଵଵ∆ܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଶ∆ܵܦܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଷ∆ܵܦܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵସ∆ܯܤ ൅ ߚଵହ∆ܣܳ
൅ ߚଵ଺∆ܴܶܣܰܵܲ ൅ ߚଵ଻∆ܩܫܰܦܧܺ ൅ ߝ  ሺ4ሻ 
 
5.2 Empirical results 
Descriptive statistics for the additional variables used to test H2 are provided in the 
bottom panel of Table 1. The average credit rating for our sample firm is 13, which is equivalent 
to a BBB+ rating on the S&P rating scale, while the average Gompers’ governance score is 9.83. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlations for the credit rating sample. The correlation between 
RATINGS and CONF_CON (CONF_DIS) is not distinguishable from zero. Contrary to our 
expectations, RATINGS is positively associated with FACTOR. We, however, note that 
univariate correlation results should be interpreted with caution since LNASSETS is strongly 
positively correlated with RATINGS and all three measures of CEO personality. Our primary 
research question is to examine whether firms’ credit ratings are systematically related to CEO 
personality after controlling for other covariates, such as size and risk. As predicted, RATINGS is 
negatively correlated with DEBT, LOSS, RET, SDRET, and SDINCOME, whereas it is positively 
correlated with INCOME, LNINT_COV, LNASSETS, and RD. The results for the information risk 
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proxies suggest that TRANSP is positively correlated with RATINGS, while AQ is negatively 
correlated with RATINGS. 
Table 5 displays the results of estimating equation (3). Results are consistent with our 
predictions. The coefficient estimate on CONF_CON is significantly negative (β1=-1.148, p-
value=.013). CONF_DIS and FACTOR also have negative and statistically significant coefficient 
estimates (β1=-0.341, p-value=0.005; β1=-0.200, p-value=0.010). We interpret these results as 
credit analysts assigning lower credit ratings for firms that have CEOs that are characterized as 
more overconfident.17  
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (4). The results are qualitatively similar 
to those presented in Table 5. The coefficient estimate on ∆CONF_CON remains significantly 
negative (β1=-1.218, p-value=0.004). The coefficient estimate on ∆CONF_DIS also stays 
significantly negative (β1=-0.455, p-value=0.006). The coefficient on FACTOR is negative, but 
not significant (β1=-0.069, p-value=0.318). The results presented in Table 6 are consistent with 
credit rating analysts downgrading credit ratings when a firm replaces a less overconfident CEO 
with one who is characterized as more overconfident.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Because it is difficult to assess the economic impact of CEO personality on credit ratings 
in an ordered logistic model with multiple categories, we estimate an alternative model that 
                                                            
17 Similar to our supplemental analysis of audit fees, we again partition CONF_CON into two separate measures and 
examine the association with credit ratings. The first measure (OVER_CON) is equal to CONF_CON when 
CONF_CON is > 0 and OVER_CON = 0 otherwise. The second measure (CONSERVATIVE_CON) is equal to -1 * 
CONF_CON when CONF_CON is < 0 and CONSERVATIVE_CON = 0 otherwise. When we re-estimate equation 
(3) and examine these two components separately, both are associated with credit ratings in the predicted direction 
(β1=-1.198, p value =0.021 for OVER_CON and β1=1.212, p value = 0.144 for CONSERVATIVE_CON). This 
finding suggests the observed association between our measure of overconfidence and credit ratings is a result of 
firms with less overconfident CEOs receiving higher credit ratings and firms with highly overconfident CEOs 
receiving lower ratings. 
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classifies observations into two categories, as in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006). Specifically, we 
create an indicator variable (INVTGRADE) that takes the value of one if a firm’s credit rating is 
BBB or higher, and zero otherwise. We then estimate the binary logistic regression using 
INVTGRADE as a dependent variable. The specification is as follows: 
Prሺܫܸܰܶܩܴܣܦܧሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚସܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚହܮܱܵܵ൅ ߚ଺ܮܰܫܰܶ_ܥܱܸ ൅ ߚ଻ܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚ଼ܥܣܲ_ܫܰܶܧܯ ൅ ߚଽܥܪܣܧܳ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܴܦ൅ ߚଵଵܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଶܵܦܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଷܵܦܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵସܯܤ ൅ ߚଵହܣܳ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܴܶܣܰܵܲ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩܫܰܦܧܺ ൅ ߝ ሺ5ሻ 
 
The estimation results presented in Table 7 are similar to those in Table 5. The coefficient 
estimates on CONF_CON and CONF_DIS are negative and significant (β1=-1.112, p-value=0.038; 
β1=-0.358, p-value=0.065) while the coefficient estimate on FACTOR is also negative but 
insignificant (β1=-0.047, p-value=0.372). 
[Insert Table 7] 
In order to assess the effect of CEO overconfidence on the likelihood of having an 
investment-grade credit rating relative to a speculative-grade credit rating, we calculate the 
changes in the probability of receiving an investment-grade credit rating when changing from a 
conservative CEO to an overconfident CEO. Results reveal that the likelihood of receiving an 
investment-grade credit rating decreases by 13.5%.18 To provide the economic significance of this 
relative to other determinants of credit ratings, we assess the economic significance of LOSS, 
which is one of the primary variables used to proxy for a firm’s default risk. Moving from 
LOSS=0 to LOSS=1 decreases the probability of receiving an investment-grade credit rating by 
18.8%.19 The probability changes of receiving an investment-grade credit rating due to changes in 
                                                            
18 All other variables except for indicator variables are held constant at their means.  
19 All other variables except for indicator variables are held constant at their means. 
24 
 
CEO personality is 72 percent of the probability changes due to the occurrence of a loss. Overall, 
we conclude that CEO overconfidence has an economically significant impact on the probability 
of receiving an investment-grade credit rating versus a speculative-grade credit rating.  
Collectively, the findings reported in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 provide strong 
support for our hypothesis that credit ratings are negatively associated with CEO overconfidence.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
A number of recent studies have documented an association between CEO personality 
and corporate decisions. In some cases, corporate decisions made by overconfident executives 
are likely to be costly to shareholders (e.g., overinvestment and fraud), while in other cases they 
benefit shareholders at the expense of debt holders (e.g., risky project selection). The tendency of 
CEOs with different personalities to make these decisions has important implications for other 
counterparties to the firm. This naturally leads to the question of whether these counterparties are 
able to identify CEO overconfidence and whether they adjust the way they contract with firms 
accordingly. We examine two important counterparties to the firm that are likely to be impacted 
by the decisions of an overconfident CEO. We find auditors charge higher fees when the CEO is 
more overconfident and that they increase audit fees when firms replace a less overconfident 
CEO with a more overconfident one. We also find credit rating agencies assign lower credit 
ratings to firms with overconfident CEOs and lower their credit ratings when firms replace a less 
overconfident CEO with a more overconfident CEO. 
Our paper is subject to several limitations. First, because we focus on Fortune 500 firms, 
our sample size is necessarily small and not representative of the underlying population of firms 
with audit fees and credit ratings. Second, press portrayals of CEOs may be correlated with 
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contemporaneous firm events. Thus, we attempt to address this concern by using a CEO-specific 
measure and alternative proxies. Finally, although our changes analysis provides us with 
significant (albeit weaker) results and reduces concerns about correlated omitted variables, we 
cannot completely eliminate the possibility that our findings are attributable to economic events 
that simultaneously lead to CEO turnover and an increase in audit fees or a decrease in credit 
ratings.    
Subject to these caveats, our results provide evidence that counterparties are able to 
identify CEO personality and modify the way they contract with the firm accordingly. Our 
analysis contributes new insight into our understanding of the sophistication of both auditors and 
credit analysts and the determinants of both audit fees and credit ratings. 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
Overconfidence Proxies 
CONF_CON Continuous CEO fixed confidence variable 
CONF_DIS Discrete CEO fixed confidence variable 
FACTOR 
The first factor obtained from a factor analysis of CONF_CON, DELAYOPTIONS, and BIAS, 
in which DELAYOPTION is the log of exercisable but unexercised option holdings and BIAS 
is the management earnings forecast bias 
Variables in Audit Fee Regressions 
LNAUDFEES Log of audit fees   
TOTAL Number of articles for each CEO for the entire sample period 
BIG4 An indicator variable that takes 1 if a firm's auditor is a member of the BIG4, and 0 otherwise 
LNASSETS Log of total assets 
BUS SEG Square root of the number of business segments of a firm from Compustat’s Segment file 
FGN Foreign sales (Compustat segment file) deflated by total sales 
INV Inventory deflated by average total assets 
REC Receivables deflated by average total assets 
DEBT Sum of short term and long term debt deflated by average total assets 
INCOME Operating income after depreciation deflated by average total assets 
LOSS An indicator variable that equals 1 if income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations is negative in the current or two previous years, and 0 otherwise 
AUD OPIN 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a modified audit opinion and 0 otherwise, 
where a modified audit opinion is defined as anything other than a standard unqualified audit 
opinion coded as 1 by Compustat 
CLIENT Square root of the number of years that a firm has been a client of its current auditor 
LITRISK An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm belongs to a high litigation industry as defined in Francis et al. (1994) 
LNABSTACC Log of the absolute value of total accruals, where total accruals is the difference between earnings and cash flow from operations 
LNABSBTD Log of the absolute value of the spread between pre-tax book income and taxable income 
ICD An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm receives a qualified opinion on its internal controls 
M&A An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm engages in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), where sum of deal values of M&A is greater than 5% of total assets 
Additional Variables in Credit Rating Regressions  
RATINGS S&P's long-term issuer credit ratings that range from AAA (20) to D (1) 
LNINT_COV Log of interest coverage, computed as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to interest expense 
CAP_INTEN Gross PPE deflated by average total assets 
CHAEQ An indicator variable that equals 1 if change in shareholder equity is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise 
RD R&D deflated by average total assets 
RET Buy-and-hold raw stock return over the past 3 years 
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SDRET Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past 3 years 
SDINCOME Standard deviation of INCOME over the past 5 years 
MB Market-to-book ratio 
AQ Negative one times the standard deviation of the firm-specific residuals from 5 years, where residuals are from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model modified by McNichols (2002) 
TRANSP 
Negative one times the squared residuals from the following regression: RET = b0 + 
b1*NIBE+b2*LOSS+b3*NIBE*LOSS+b4*CHA_NIBE+e, where RET is market adjusted 
returns; NIBE is income before extraordinary items; LOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 
when NIBE is negative, and 0 otherwise; CHA_NIBE is change in NIBE 
GINDEX Shareholder rights governance score defined as in Gompers et al. (2003)   
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N MEAN MEDIAN STDEV 1Q 3Q 
Variables in Audit Fee Regressions 
LNAUDFEES 2833 1.276 1.281 1.157 0.558 1.932 
CONF_CON 2833 0.017 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.033 
CONF_DIS 2833 0.261 0.000 0.618 0.000 1.000 
FACTOR 1858 0.000 -0.058 1.000 -0.607 0.502 
TOTAL 2833 66.730 15.000 181.504 5.000 52.000 
BIG4 2833 0.989 1.000 0.106 1.000 1.000 
LNASSETS 2833 9.197 9.215 1.086 8.427 9.940 
BUS SEG 2833 1.831 1.732 0.790 1.000 2.449 
FGN 2833 0.220 0.151 0.232 0.000 0.408 
INV 2833 0.126 0.084 0.137 0.024 0.174 
REC 2833 0.143 0.117 0.114 0.061 0.186 
DEBT 2833 0.291 0.274 0.177 0.165 0.398 
INCOME 2833 0.107 0.095 0.077 0.058 0.152 
LOSS 2833 0.246 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.000 
AUD OPIN 2833 0.619 1.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
CLIENT 2833 13.561 11.000 10.071 5.000 20.000 
LITRISK 2833 0.259 0.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 
LNABSTACC 2833 4.883 4.935 1.418 4.048 5.820 
LNABSBTD 2833 5.380 5.453 1.602 4.366 6.516 
ICD 2833 0.023 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 
M&A 2833 0.101 0.000 0.301 0.000 0.000 
Additional Variables in Credit Rating Regressions 
RATINGS 2158 12.780 13.000 3.038 11.000 15.000 
LNINT_COV 2158 2.169 2.104 1.037 1.474 2.761 
CAP_INTEN 2158 0.625 0.598 0.362 0.343 0.877 
CHAEQ 2158 0.463 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
RD 2158 0.016 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.019 
RET 2158 0.414 0.385 0.534 0.113 0.673 
SDRET 2158 0.097 0.087 0.049 0.063 0.116 
SDINCOME 2158 0.028 0.019 0.026 0.012 0.034 
MB 2158 3.403 2.563 3.928 1.645 4.062 
AQ 2158 -0.080 -0.030 0.156 -0.061 -0.017 
TRANSP 2158 -0.060 -0.017 0.114 -0.062 -0.003 
GINDEX 2158 9.832 10.000 2.514 8.000 11.000 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except for CON_DIS, FACTOR, TOTAL, BIG4, BUS 
SEG, LOSS, AUD OPIN, CLIENT, LITRISK, ICD, M&A, RATINGS, CHAEQ, and, GINDEX. 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Audit Fee Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 LNAUDFEES 1.00 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.40 0.23 0.33 -0.27 0.14 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.17 0.10 -0.12 0.22 0.33 0.14 -0.03 
2 CONF_CON  1.00 0.70 0.80 0.04 0.01 0.19 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.04 
3 CONF_DIS   1.00 0.60 0.22 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.12 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.04 
4 FACTOR    1.00 0.11 0.09 0.17 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.32 -0.15 -0.06 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.16 -0.09 0.08 
5 TOTAL     1.00 0.03 0.38 0.12 0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.25 0.02 0.00 
6 BIG4      1.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.02 -0.05 
7 LNASSETS       1.00 0.21 0.13 -0.40 -0.21 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.17 0.12 -0.04 0.53 0.64 0.02 0.03 
8 BUS SEG      1.00 0.09 -0.19 0.07 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.18 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.07 
9 FGN      1.00 -0.15 0.28 -0.21 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.08 -0.01 
10 INV      1.00 0.03 -0.13 0.20 -0.11 -0.12 -0.01 0.27 -0.09 -0.32 -0.01 -0.01 
11 REC      1.00 -0.13 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 0.10 -0.09 -0.01 -0.18 0.05 0.05 
12 DEBT      1.00 -0.19 0.13 0.06 -0.10 -0.23 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 
13 INCOME      1.00 -0.48 -0.16 0.08 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 0.12 
14 LOSS       1.00 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.16 0.13 -0.07 
15 AUD OPIN       1.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.16 0.09 -0.01 
16 CLIENT       1.00 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.05 
17 LITRISK       1.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 LNABSTACC                  1.00 0.39 0.01 0.00 
19 LNABSBTD                   1.00 0.07 0.05 
20 ICD       1.00 -0.03 
21 M&A                                         1.00 
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Panel B: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Credit Rating Sample 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 RATINGS 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.18 -0.29 0.45 -0.46 0.52 0.33 0.02 0.03 0.18 -0.12 -0.51 -0.17 0.29 -0.11 0.16 0.06 
2 CONF_CON  1.00 0.51 0.64 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.11 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
3 CONF_DIS   1.00 0.64 0.20 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.27 -0.10 -0.01 0.20 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
4 FACTOR    1.00 0.10 -0.09 0.22 -0.03 0.17 0.23 -0.11 0.00 0.15 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.16 0.01 -0.03 -0.14 
5 TOTAL     1.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.35 -0.12 -0.06 0.15 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.23 -0.02 -0.15 
6 DEBT     1.00 -0.25 0.15 -0.70 0.06 0.16 0.01 -0.28 -0.10 0.14 -0.18 -0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.00 
7 INCOME     1.00 -0.45 0.70 -0.10 -0.07 0.07 0.14 0.26 -0.26 0.03 0.46 -0.07 0.13 0.03 
8 LOSS     1.00 -0.39 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.16 0.48 0.30 -0.18 0.01 -0.24 -0.08 
9 LNINT_COV     1.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.05 0.30 0.18 -0.26 0.10 0.31 -0.11 0.08 -0.01 
10 LNASSETS     1.00 0.14 -0.05 0.09 -0.13 -0.24 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 -0.19 
11 CAP_INTEN     1.00 0.00 -0.19 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 0.15 0.06 0.05 
12 CHAEQ     1.00 0.04 0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 
13 RD      1.00 -0.02 0.09 0.26 0.20 -0.10 -0.14 -0.01 
14 RET      1.00 0.08 0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 
15 SDRET      1.00 0.36 -0.14 0.08 -0.35 -0.11 
16 SDINCOME      1.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.17 -0.08 
17 MB      1.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 
18 AQ      1.00 -0.01 0.08 
19 TRANSP      1.00 0.05 
20 GINDEX                                       1.00 
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This table presents Pearson correlations for the variables used in our analyses. Panel A (B) reports Pearson correlations for the variables in the audit fee (credit 
rating) sample. Bold numbers are significant at the 0.05 level. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 
Regressions of Audit Fees on CEO Overconfidence 
ܮܰܣܷܦܨܧܧܵ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷܤܫܩ4 ൅ ߚସܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚହܤܷܵ ܵܧܩ൅ ߚ଺ܨܩܰ ൅ ߚ଻ܫܸܰ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܧܥ ൅ ߚଽܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵଵܮܱܵܵ ൅ ߚଵଶܣܷܦ ܱܲܫܰ൅ ߚଵଷܥܮܫܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଵସܮܫܴܶܫܵܭ ൅ ߚଵହܮܰܣܤܵܶܣܥܥ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܮܰܣܤܵܤܶܦ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܫܥܦ൅ ߚଵ଼ܯ&ܣ ൅ ߝ  ሺ1ሻ 
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT ? -1.886*** 0.002 -1.897*** 0.002 -2.921*** <.0001 
CONF_CON + 1.082*** 0.001         
CONF_DIS +     0.120*** 0.001     
FACTOR +         0.057** 0.022 
TOTAL ? 0.000* 0.095 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.397 
BIG4 + 0.180 0.292 0.201 0.272 0.304 0.232 
LNASSETS + 0.272*** <.0001 0.274*** <.0001 0.396***  <.0001 
BUS SEG + 0.103*** 0.001 0.097*** 0.002 0.075** 0.049 
FGN + 0.571*** 0.000 0.567*** 0.000 0.871*** <.0001 
INV + -0.796 0.944 -0.813 0.948 -0.179 0.625 
REC + 0.716* 0.068 0.702* 0.073 0.404 0.214 
DEBT + 0.381* 0.076 0.373* 0.080 0.862** 0.031 
INCOME ? -0.116 0.813 -0.095 0.847 -0.308 0.573 
LOSS + 0.121** 0.027 0.123** 0.025 0.093* 0.059 
AUD OPIN + 0.082** 0.022 0.077** 0.028 0.058 0.107 
CLIENT + -0.001 0.656 -0.001 0.670 -0.004 0.923 
LITRISK + -0.146 0.849 -0.166 0.881 -0.092 0.768 
LNABSTACC + 0.014 0.171 0.012 0.200 0.014 0.142 
LNABSBTD + 0.044*** 0.008 0.044*** 0.008 0.035** 0.042 
ICD + 0.317***  <.0001 0.331*** <.0001 0.200** 0.020 
M&A + -0.205 1.000 -0.204 1.000 -0.167 0.984 
R-squared 0.4713 0.4717 0.6113 
obs.   2833   2833   1858   
This table provides the results of regressing audit fees on CEO overconfidence for the audit fee sample. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year and industry indicator variables are 
included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are based on one-
tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 4 
Regressions of Changes in Audit Fees on Changes in CEO Overconfidence 
∆ܮܰܣܷܦܨܧܧܵ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ∆ܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷ∆ܤܫܩ4 ൅ ߚସ∆ܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚହ∆ܤܷܵ ܵܧܩ൅ ߚ଺∆ܨܩܰ ൅ ߚ଻∆ܫܸܰ ൅ ߚ଼∆ܴܧܥ ൅ ߚଽ∆ܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚଵ଴∆ܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵଵ∆ܮܱܵܵ൅ ߚଵଶ∆ܣܷܦ ܱܲܫܰ ൅ ߚଵଷ∆ܥܮܫܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଵସܮܫܴܶܫܵܭ ൅ ߚଵହ∆ܮܰܣܤܵܶܣܥܥ൅ ߚଵ଺∆ܮܰܣܤܵܤܶܦ ൅ ߚଵ଻∆ܫܥܦ ൅ ߚଵ଼∆ܯ&ܣ ൅ ߝ  ሺ2ሻ 
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT ? 0.162*** <.0001 0.164*** <.0001 0.168*** <.0001 
∆CONF_CON + 0.152 0.174         
∆CONF_DIS +     0.056*** 0.010     
∆FACTOR +         -0.001 0.510 
∆TOTAL ? 0.000 0.498 0.000 0.579 0.000 0.927 
∆BIG4 + 0.055 0.323 0.054 0.324 0.258* 0.078 
∆LNASSETS + 0.219** 0.032 0.219** 0.033 0.224* 0.091 
∆BUS SEG + -0.025 0.803 -0.027 0.814 0.007 0.414 
∆FGN + 0.085 0.268 0.087 0.263 0.191 0.132 
∆INV + -0.030 0.518 -0.034 0.520 0.548 0.266 
∆REC + -0.766 0.856 -0.754 0.853 -0.253 0.675 
∆DEBT + 0.015 0.478 0.014 0.480 0.054 0.452 
∆INCOME ? -0.144 0.599 -0.147 0.591 -0.380 0.325 
∆LOSS + 0.129*** 0.009 0.130*** 0.009 0.011 0.402 
∆AUD OPIN + -0.003 0.561 -0.004 0.570 -0.009 0.646 
∆CLIENT + -0.004 0.874 -0.004 0.874 -0.002 0.667 
LITRISK + 0.006 0.411 0.007 0.390 -0.043 0.947 
∆LNABSTACC + -0.001 0.544 -0.001 0.557 0.004 0.266 
∆LNABSBTD + 0.008 0.167 0.008 0.161 0.002 0.421 
∆ICD + 0.183*** <.0001 0.181*** <.0001 0.204*** 0.000 
∆M&A + -0.018 0.644 -0.018 0.645 0.008 0.408 
R-squared 0.0919 0.0925 0.1120 
obs.   2343   2343   1541   
This table provides the results of regressing changes in audit fees on changes in CEO overconfidence for the audit 
fee sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year and industry 
indicator variables are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-
values are based on one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 5 
Ordered Logistic Regressions of Credit Ratings on CEO Overconfidence 
Pr ሺܴܣܶܫܰܩܵሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚସܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚହܮܱܵܵ൅ ߚ଺ܮܰܫܰܶ_ܥܱܸ ൅ ߚ଻ܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚ଼ܥܣܲ_ܫܰܶܧܰ ൅ ߚଽܥܪܣܧܳ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܴܦ ൅ ߚଵଵܴܧܶ൅ ߚଵଶܵܦܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଷܵܦܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵସܯܤ ൅ ߚଵହܣܳ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܴܶܣܰܵܲ ൅ ߚଵ଻ܩܫܰܦܧܺ൅ ߝ  ሺ3ሻ 
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
CONF_CON - -1.148** 0.013         
CONF_DIS -     -0.341*** 0.005     
FACTOR -         -0.200** 0.010 
TOTAL ? 0.001 0.422 0.001 0.273 0.000 0.969 
DEBT - -1.297** 0.029 -1.236** 0.037 -1.507** 0.041 
INCOME + 5.925*** 0.001 5.803*** 0.001 6.855*** 0.002 
LOSS - -0.728*** <.0001 -0.750*** <.0001 -0.797*** 0.000 
LNINT_COV + 0.860*** <.0001 0.874*** <.0001 0.858*** <.0001 
LNASSETS + 0.918*** <.0001 0.951*** <.0001 0.984*** <.0001 
CAP_INTEN + 0.024 0.454 -0.021 0.541 0.175 0.251 
CHAEQ + 0.059 0.214 0.064 0.197 0.073 0.202 
RD ? 8.302*** 0.003 8.924*** 0.002 10.599*** 0.003 
RET ? -0.777*** <.0001 -0.786*** <.0001 -1.072*** <.0001 
SDRET - -28.852*** <.0001 -28.879*** <.0001 -29.398*** <.0001 
SDINCOME - -6.276** 0.022 -6.003** 0.025 -4.364 0.122 
MB ? 0.057*** 0.001 0.059*** 0.001 0.082*** 0.000 
AQ + -1.156 0.993 -1.126 0.992 -1.060 0.963 
TRANSP + 0.611* 0.093 0.594* 0.099 0.608 0.168 
GINDEX ? 0.074** 0.018 0.077** 0.014 0.065* 0.071 
obs.   2158   2158   1512   
This table provides the results of regressing credit ratings on CEO overconfidence for the credit rating sample. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year indicator variables are included. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are based on one-tailed tests 
for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 6 
Ordered Logistic Regressions of Changes in Credit Ratings on Changes in CEO 
Overconfidence 
Prሺ∆ܴܣܶܫܰܩܵሻ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ∆ܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܶ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܱܶܶܣܮ ൅ ߚଷ∆ܦܧܤܶ ൅ ߚସ∆ܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚହܮܱܵܵ൅ ߚ଺∆ܮܰܫܰܶ_ܥܱܸ ൅ ߚ଻∆ܮܰܣܵܵܧܶܵ ൅ ߚ଼∆ܥܣܲ_ܫܰܶܧܰ ൅ ߚଽܥܪܣܧܳ ൅ ߚଵ଴∆ܴܦ൅ ߚଵଵ∆ܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଶ∆ܵܦܴܧܶ ൅ ߚଵଷ∆ܵܦܫܰܥܱܯܧ ൅ ߚଵସ∆ܯܤ ൅ ߚଵହ∆ܣܳ ൅ ߚଵ଺∆ܴܶܣܰܵܲ൅ ߚଵ଻∆ܩܫܰܦܧܺ ൅ ߝ  ሺ4ሻ 
  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
∆CONF_CON - -1.218*** 0.004         
∆CONF_DIS -     -0.455*** 0.006     
∆FACTOR -         -0.069 0.318 
∆TOTAL ? -0.001 0.302 0.000 0.472 -0.001 0.593 
∆DEBT - -4.805*** <.0001 -4.812*** <.0001 -4.877*** <.0001 
∆INCOME + -2.455 0.862 -2.282 0.844 -1.874 0.701 
LOSS - -0.629*** <.0001 -0.615*** <.0001 -0.554*** 0.002 
∆LNINT_COV + 0.954*** <.0001 0.946*** <.0001 1.049*** <.0001 
∆LNASSETS + 1.456*** 0.000 1.462*** 0.000 1.796*** 0.000 
∆CAP_INTEN + 0.900 0.144 0.886 0.148 2.526** 0.012 
CHAEQ + 0.002 0.493 0.000 0.499 0.026 0.424 
∆RD ? 1.890 0.769 1.761 0.784 4.834 0.463 
∆RET ? 0.024 0.870 0.015 0.920 -0.048 0.788 
∆SDRET - -21.638*** <.0001 -21.494*** <.0001 -20.889*** <.0001 
∆SDINCOME - -5.848* 0.083 -6.023* 0.075 -3.953 0.251 
∆MB ? -0.008 0.587 -0.007 0.666 -0.016 0.438 
∆AQ + -0.087 0.550 -0.107 0.561 0.081 0.458 
∆TRANSP + -0.512 0.885 -0.538 0.895 -0.228 0.655 
∆GINDEX ? 0.024 0.846 0.025 0.841 0.093 0.526 
obs.   1789   1789   1239   
This table provides results of regressing changes in credit ratings on changes in CEO overconfidence for the credit 
rating sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year indicator 
variables are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are 
based on one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 7 
Binary Logistic Regressions of Credit Ratings on CEO Overconfidence 
Pr ሺܫܸܰܶܩܴܣܦܧሻ
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  Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Sign Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT ? -9.932*** <.0001 -10.066*** <.0001 -10.935*** <.0001 
CONF_CON - -1.112** 0.038         
CONF_DIS -     -0.358* 0.065     
FACTOR -         -0.047 0.372 
TOTAL ? -0.001* 0.092 -0.001 0.232 -0.002** 0.031 
DEBT - -2.585*** 0.009 -2.586*** 0.008 -3.956*** 0.005 
INCOME + 3.114 0.166 3.003 0.172 2.943 0.229 
LOSS - -0.846*** 0.001 -0.846*** 0.001 -0.900*** 0.009 
LNINT_COV + 0.956*** 0.000 0.955*** 0.000 0.995*** 0.003 
LNASSETS + 1.180*** <.0001 1.206*** <.0001 1.391*** <.0001 
CAP_INTEN + 0.107 0.384 0.075 0.419 0.902** 0.023 
CHAEQ + -0.237 0.944 -0.247 0.951 -0.313 0.930 
RD ? 3.439 0.424 4.081 0.355 6.315 0.356 
RET ? -0.657*** <.0001 -0.658*** <.0001 -0.881*** <.0001 
SDRET - -30.408*** <.0001 -30.423*** <.0001 -32.030*** <.0001 
SDINCOME - -7.775* 0.087 -7.573* 0.088 -11.142* 0.073 
MB ? 0.029* 0.089 0.030* 0.079 0.028 0.217 
AQ + 0.284 0.369 0.355 0.339 0.903 0.183 
TRANSP + -0.837 0.829 -0.852 0.832 -0.603 0.717 
GINDEX ? 0.160*** 0.003 0.158*** 0.004 0.142** 0.050 
obs.   2158   2158   1512   
This table provides results of regressing investment grade ratings on CEO overconfidence for the credit rating 
sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by CEO. Year indicator variables 
are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (p-values are based on 
one-tailed tests for signed predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
